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ABSTRACT : Useful information may be leaked by digital 
electronic circuits in their conducted and radiated 
electromagnetic emissions.  The leakage signals can be 
captured and analysed using side-channel analysis techniques.  
This paper describes a current research project to explore the 
application of statistical analysis to measured electromagnetic 
emissions from a smart card system.  Experimental results 
showed that logic state switching transient currents contain 
information related to the hamming weights of processed data.  
A differential side channel analysis (DSCA) technique was 
applied and it demonstrated that good correlation could be 
obtained when a correct sub-key was encountered. 
 
Index Terms：  electromagnetic emissions, switching transients, 
data security, side channel analysis, 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The field and discipline of electromagnetic 
interference/electromagnetic compatibility (EMI/EMC) is 
concerned with ensuring that a device ‘performs’ adequately 
in its intended environment, by neither interfering with the 
correct operation of other electronic devices, nor being 
interfered with by those other devices or itself. The usual 
notion of ‘performance’ focuses on meeting regulatory 
standards and avoiding functional failures. In this paper, we 
seek to raise awareness of another important dimension of 
‘performance’ that also deserves consideration from an EMC 
perspective. This is the dimension of emissions security, also 
known in defence and military circles as TEMPEST.  With the 
increasing adoption in the broader community of smart cards, 
RFID tags and wirelessly networked electronic devices, 
emissions security is no longer an esoteric concern that can be 
ignored. Each of these types of devices relies on cryptography 
to authenticate and secure communications over unprotected 
channels, for example, the electromagnetic spectrum or the 
Internet. Moreover, cryptography assumes that secret keys can 
be kept secret both when they are being stored and when they 
are being used in the confines of an integrated circuit, 
processor or embedded system. Unfortunately, this 
assumption is not well founded because semiconductor based 
processor logic leaks information about its internal state 
(including any cryptographic key it may be using) via the side 
channels of conducted and radiated electromagnetic 
emissions. 
In this paper we explain the basic principles and techniques 
of Side Channel Analysis, in the course of reporting on a 
current research project that is exploring the application of 
EMC-based signal collection, processing and statistical 
analysis techniques to unearth useful information from 
conducted and radiated electrical noise. 
II. CMOS AND POWER CONSUMPTION 
The CMOS logic gate is the basic building block of most 
integrated circuits and processors. Although there is only a 
negligible current leakage when a CMOS logic gate maintains 
the same logical state across a clock transition, it dissipates a 
comparatively large amount of power when its logical state 
switches from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0. As a consequence of this 
behaviour, it is possible to coarsely model the instantaneous 
power consumption of a CMOS circuit as the sum of the 
power dissipated by each transitioning gate plus a Gaussian 
noise component. This is of great practical interest from a 
security perspective because processor instructions that 
directly manipulate data, (e.g. MOV, XOR) leak information 
about the data in the amount of power that the instruction 
consumes. For example, a MOV instruction with an operand 
of all zero bits consumes less power than one where all bits of 
the operand are set to ones. In fact, it is possible to ‘read’ the 
hamming weight of the operand (the number of bits in the 
byte that are set to one) directly from the trace of the power 
consumption at the time the instruction is executed. Eight 
different operand hamming weights can be clearly seen in 
Figure 1 as eight distinct peaks of increasing amplitude. 
Consider that the operand may be a cryptographic key that is 
assumed to be securely protected by the processor. By 
monitoring the device’s power consumption, an attacker can 
discover important information about the key, possibly 
enough to violate the assumption of secrecy. 
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Figure 1: Power consumption traces of MOV instruction 
with operand hamming weights from 1 to 8 
In addition to conducted emissions, a circuit also produces 
radiated emissions whose features are correlated, both directly 
and more subtly, to the instantaneous power consumption and 
therefore, to the data that the processor is manipulating. This 
is a simple consequence of the observation that a changing 
current flowing through a wire creates an electromagnetic 
field and the nature of the current can be inferred by 
monitoring the field. Since an integrated circuit is largely 
comprised of wires and current loops, each contributes its part 
to the complex radiated emission field. Useful and detailed 
information about the internal state of the device can be 
inferred by monitoring its electromagnetic emissions. 
Moreover, coupling effects due to parasitic capacitance 
between wires in an integrated circuit can result in the logical 
data they carry being modulated on strong carriers such as the 
higher order harmonics of the clock frequency [1]. The 
information can be recovered by tuning a sensitive wide band 
demodulator to these carrier frequencies. Our research project 
is exploring the nature of this electromagnetic information 
leakage and techniques for its capture and interpretation.  
In constrained devices such as smart cards and RFID tags, 
effective electromagnetic shielding remains elusive so 
radiated side channel leakage is a serious issue. This is 
compounded by the fact that electromagnetic emissions can be 
monitored at a distance, leading to plausible, real-world attack 
scenarios. The electromagnetic side channel appears to be 
more difficult to sanitize than the conducted side channel 
whose information content can be reduced via filtering. 
III. MEASUREMENT SETUP 
In order to measure the power consumption, a readily 
available smart card programmer [2] was modified to include 
a current sensing resistor in the ground return of the onboard 
card holder. With a smart card inserted, the signals across the 
resistor were captured with a digital oscilloscope operating at 
a sampling rate of 200 MS/s.  The digitised signals were 
transferred to a PC for further analysis.  A typical 
experimental setup is shown in Figure 2a.   
A number of algorithms were programmed into the smart 
card and current waveforms associated with each algorithm 
were captured.  Figure 2b shows a typical waveform recorded. 
 
 
Figure 2a: Experimental Setup showing PIC16F84 smart 
card, modified reader and oscilloscope with test power 
trace. 
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Figure 2b: Typical measured waveform across current 
sensing resistor 
IV. DIFFERENTIAL SIDE CHANNEL ANALYSIS 
In Section II we described information leakages that could 
be directly inferred by monitoring a single execution of a 
vulnerable instruction. By way of example, we showed that 
the hamming weight of the operand of a MOV instruction 
could be read from its corresponding power trace. This is 
known as simple side channel analysis, i.e., when useful 
information is inferred from the analysis of a single trace of a 
side channel. While knowledge of the hamming weight 
reduces the number of possible values an unknown key can 
take, it does not disclose the actual value since the positions of 
the set bits remains unknown.  The technique of differential 
side channel analysis (DSCA) can address this problem. 
Differential side channel analysis, first introduced by Kocher 
et. al., [3] is a very powerful analysis method that can reveal 
actual bit values and their position, based on analysis of side 
channel traces gathered from multiple executions of an 
algorithm using the same secret key but different input data. 
In our project, we are exploring a different technique to the 
more widely reported ‘difference of means’ approach 
introduced in [3]. We are drawing on ideas outlined in 
Mangard’s recent thesis [4], to attack an implementation of 
the DES algorithm [5] implemented on a PIC16F84 based 
smart card. While we make no claims as to the novelty of the 
approach, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the 
first time that the approach has been reported in the context of 
attacking the DES algorithm.  
We now provide an informal description of the general 
approach. In the algorithm being attacked, there must be an 
instruction that combines a few bits of the key with known 
input data to produce some intermediate result. This 
instruction should exhibit a data dependent side channel 
leakage. In our case, we exploit the fact that the hamming 
weight of the result of an XOR operation leaks in the power 
consumption trace. Furthermore, in the final iteration of the 
DES round function, the round sub key is XORed with a data 
block (see Figure 3) whose value can be directly calculated 
from the output (cipher text), so the attack preconditions are 
met.  
 
Figure 3: The DES round function showing the targeted 
XOR (+) of round key (K) and data. Source[5]. 
 
We record discrete time/power traces for the algorithm as it 
processes approximately three hundred different plaintext 
inputs with the same key. The corresponding cipher text 
outputs are also recorded. This produces a matrix where each 
row holds the time series of discrete power sample values for 
the algorithm as it processes a single cipher text, and each 
column holds the instantaneous power consumption at time t. 
The traces must be carefully aligned so that power 
consumption data points in each column correspond to the 
same algorithmic ‘event’ across each of the 300 cipher texts. 
An algorithmic event is represented by a column or vector of 
300 discrete power values.  One of these ‘event vectors’ 
(actually a few due to the high sampling rate, but for 
simplicity we will refer to one) will correspond to the 
targeted, vulnerable XOR operation. This concept is 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
For each cipher text we reverse the final few steps of the 
algorithm to calculate the data block (R32) that was XORed 
with the 48 bits of the final round sub key. Due to the 
structure of the DES algorithm, we do not need to know the 
correct key to be able to do this. Since we are attacking the 
sub key 8 bits at a time, we calculate the hamming weight of 
the result of the XOR combination of the relevant 8 bits of the 
known data block with each of the 256 possible values of the 
sub key byte. We populate a matrix of 300 rows, each 
corresponding to a cipher text, and 256 columns, each 
corresponding to a possible value of the sub key. The data 
values in a column contain the calculated hamming weights of 
the intermediate XOR result for a single key guess across each 
of the 300 cipher texts. A column can be thought of as a 
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vector of hypothetical power consumption values for one 
‘guess’ of the key. We take each of these 256 ‘guess’ vectors 
in turn and calculate its correlation with each of the t event 
vectors described in the previous paragraph. As we noted, one 
of the event vectors will correspond to the targeted XOR 
event. When the guess vector for the correct key is processed 
against the relevant XOR event vector, there will be a high 
degree of correlation (see Figure 6) because the power 
consumption of the XOR instruction (represented by the event 
vector) is a function of the hamming weight of the XOR result 
(represented by the guess vector). More simply, the XOR 
event vector and correct guess vector comprise pairs of data 
points which each ‘swing in the same direction’. Incorrect 
guess vectors will not swing in the same direction across all 
pairs and will therefore not correlate to the same degree. This 
concept is illustrated in Figure 5. The high correlation reveals 
the correct sub key byte. We recalculate the guess vector 
matrix for the next sub key byte and repeat the process.  
Note that we do not need to know where in a trace of t 
power values the XOR event occurs. The knowledge that 
somewhere there is a calculation of an intermediate result that 
directly combines key bits and known input bits via an 
instruction that leaks information about its operands is 
enough.  
 
Figure 6: Correlation of correct and incorrect guess 
vectors. The 0.8 peak signifies the correct sub key. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Conducted and radiated electromagnetic emissions from a 
digital circuit contain useful information which can be 
captured and analysed.  By using simple power measurement 
and analysis techniques, it has been demonstrated in this paper 
that encryption keys could be readily detected. This work will 
be extended in the future to retrieve information from 
captured radiated electromagnetic fields. 
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Figure 4: Instantaneous Power consumption at time t  
across multiple traces represents an 'event vector'.
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